Trials and Transformations, 2001–2004 by Frame Tom;

Author:Frame, Tom;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of New South Wales Press

14

IRAQ AND THE POLITICS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS

ALBERT PALAZZO

A decision to go to war is always the result of a calculation weighing the presumed benefit of going to war against the anticipated costs, and comparing these with the prospects of success. It is a highly rational process and all states – and non-states – assess these factors before deciding to go to war. Even the non-aggressor in a war makes this calculation: it must decide to resist or to concede. These are all enduring features of war.1

The goal desired or the projected cost are not the key factors in calculating the decision, but rather the accuracy of the data and the degree of honesty sustained in conducting the analysis. Data is notoriously incomplete or inaccurate, while honesty in decision-making can be corrupted by ideology, greed, wistfulness, the intellectual shortfalls of the decision-makers and a host of other human frailties. Many such decisions fall prey to hubris and irrationality; for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in the Second World War. In making the calculation, the enemy’s fighting ability and the strength of its military personnel’s will – and the will of the opponent’s civilian population – may be impossible to assess reliably. Even the strength of one’s own forces may prove difficult to appreciate. The American historians Williamson Murray and Allan R Millett in their groundbreaking study of net assessment have rightly described the assessment of strengths and weaknesses as ‘the most intractable problem of defence planning’.2

I will look at the nature, quality and honesty of the calculations the United States and Australia made in deciding to initiate a war with Iraq in 2003. My aim is to throw light on the priorities of these two allies and, in doing so, demonstrate that the processes they employed were severely flawed. The consequences of their decisions continue to play out in Iraq, throughout the Middle East and elsewhere.

War goals

As close partners, the United States and Australia usually seek the same war goals. This was not the case in 2003. Both countries went to war to advance their own priorities. In international relations, it is to be expected that governments will put their national interests first; coalition operations are no exception.3 In the case of the war with Iraq, however, the goals of the United States and Australia differed widely. While not contradictory, they did not have the same centres of gravity, nor was their geographic focus in the same theatre of operations. This divergence in ambitions was not for public consumption. Both Australia and the United States repeatedly stated that the reason for the war was to locate and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). George W Bush, the United States president, and John Howard, the prime minister of Australia, frequently reiterated the need to prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists who might then use them against their respective homelands. Iraq was to be disarmed of its WMDs and prevented from producing more. As war

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